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1 Introduction
International mergers increasingly shape the industrial structure of developed
and developing economies alike.1 This is probably a natural development. At
some stage domestic economies of scale are exhausted. In addition, economic
integration means that not only trade but also the market for corporate con-
trol is liberalised. The question remains, though, if firms also can have strate-
gic reasons for choosing an international rather than a national merger. The
purpose of this paper is to apply an international oligopoly model to analyse
how the interplay between the labour market and the product market may
aﬀect firms’ merger decisions. Could it be that firms merge internationally
rather than nationally to curb the market power of trade unions? If so, will we
observe a higher number of international mergers than would be optimal seen
from a welfare point of view, or perhaps that international mergers supplant
domestic ones to an excessive degree?
To analyse such questions, a natural starting point would be the existing
models on mergers and merger policy in open economies.2 However, most of
the existing literature is about domestic mergers with spillovers on foreign
agents, and often focusing on the interplay between merger policy and trade
policy. In contrast, we focus on firms’ choice between a domestic and a cross-
border merger.3 Horn and Persson (2001a) suggest that cooperative game
theory could be used to pinpoint which industry structure will materialise
when many diﬀerent mergers are possible. We apply this method to solve for
the equilibrium market structure when we allow for any two-firm merger in a
situation with four firms initially.4 As a robustness check, we also describe two
versions of a non-cooperative acquisition game that yield the same prediction
1Gugler et al. (2003) identify five great merger waves during the past century and
point out that the fraction of international mergers has steadily increased. As reported
in UNCTAD (2000, 2002), in 1999 the total value of worldwide cross-border mergers and
acquisitions amounted to more than 80 per cent of world FDI flows. In the same year,
the share in all M&A that was cross-border, in value terms, reached nearly 31 per cent.
Furthermore, about 70 per cent of all cross-border M&As are horizontal. In order to give
an illustration of the increased importance of transnational corporations, foreign aﬃliates
accounted for about 54 million employees worldwide in 2001, compared to 24 million in
1990.
2See, e.g., Dixit (1984), Barros and Cabral (1994), Long and Vousden (1995), Head and
Ries (1997), Sørgard (1997), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), Collie (2003)
and Neary (2003, 2004).
3Some papers study how firms in one country may access the market in some other
country. Cross-border mergers are studied as one alternative way of access, with greenfield
investment and exports as alternatives. See Norbäck and Persson (2004), Bjorvatn (2004)
and Bertrand (2003).
4Horn and Persson (2001b) apply their own method to an international oligopoly sit-
uation. They show how reduced trade costs influence merger patterns in an international
oligopoly. More precisely, they suggest that lower trade costs tend to favour international
mergers. As will become apparent, this is rather far removed from the points that are
highlighted in the present paper. Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (forthcoming), Straume
(2003), Huck and Konrad (2004), Saggi and Yildiz (forthcoming), Yildiz (2002) and Spearot
(2004) also follow the endogenous merger track in international settings.
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about market structure as the cooperative framework.5
The novel feature of the present work is the focus on the interaction be-
tween market power in the product market and in the labour market. Already
Brander and Spencer (1988), Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989) and De Fraja
(1993) suggested that oligopoly power in the product market might be an
important reason why trade unions have the potential to influence wage set-
ting.6 Empirical studies suggest that mergers in the product market — which
leads to higher concentration — may in fact influence wages. But the picture
is mixed. Some studies find that a merger leads to higher wages, while oth-
ers find the opposite result or no eﬀect at all.7 Unfortunately, there are few
theoretical studies that can guide us on how mergers should be expected to
aﬀect wages. The present paper helps to fill this gap by showing how diﬀerent
types of mergers can have distinctly diﬀerent eﬀect on wages and in turn on
profits and welfare.
A core idea in the present paper is that an international merger can tilt
the power balance between employers and workers. We study an international
Cournot oligopoly with two domestic and two foreign firms, where wages are
set by monopoly trade unions. The analysis rests further on the assumption
that it is easier for workers to organise within, as opposed to across, national
borders.8 This notion is most conveniently implemented by letting trade
unions be national by assumption: any firm operating in a given economy
meets the wage claims of the relevant national union. As long as there are
national unions — or at least that unions within a nation cooperate more easily
than unions in diﬀerent countries — then an international merger, as opposed
to a national one, will imply that the merged firm meets two uncoordinated
unions.
Since we model market power both in the input (labour) and output mar-
ket, a merger will change both output prices and wages. A national merger
makes market shares less sensitive to wage changes, which gives the unions
5An alternative to the cooperative route is obviously to model acqusitions as a non-
cooperative bidding game. See Kamien and Zang (1990) for one such model. Theories of
sequential mergers, as in Nilssen and Sørgard (1998), also picture mergers as alternatives
to each other.
6For recent work on the eﬀect of globalisation with international unionised oligopoly, see
Naylor (1998), Munch and Skaksen (2002) and Lommerud, Meland and Sørgard (2003).
7Brown and Medoﬀ (1988), Cremieux and Van Audenrode (1996) and Peoples, Hekmat
and Moini (1993) find support for a wage cut following a merger, while McGuckin and
Nguyen (2001) find the opposite result. Hekmat (1995) finds no evidence of any link between
mergers and wages, while Gokhale, Groshen and Neumark (1995) find no or only a limited
evidence of a link between takeovers and wages. Finally, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) find
that mergers have no eﬀect on employment in the US while it leads to lower employment
in Europe, which might have to do with the degree of pre-merger wage flexibility.
8Formal union cooperation across national borders is indeed very rarely observed. In a
survey Marginson and Schulten (2000) conclude that ‘the development of any pan-European
collective bargaining structures to determine pay and major conditions at inter-sector, sector
and/or multinational company levels remains a distant prospect’. In addition to historical,
institutional and cultural explanations, this is probably also explained by the relatively high
degree of cross-border immobility of labour.
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an incentive to raise wages, and more so for the firms not taking part in the
merger. An international merger, on the other hand, has a distinctly diﬀerent
eﬀect on the unions’ wage setting. An international merger would imply that
the merged firm is served by two diﬀerent unions, each producing input to one
of the merged firm’s two products. Then the merged firm can partly replace
sales of one of its products by increasing the sales of the other product. Since
an international merger leads to such a flexibility, it triggers increased com-
petition between the unions. As a result, the unions compete more fiercely
on wages.9 We also allow for the possibility of exogenous merger synergies in
the form of non-labour cost savings for the merger participants. The presence
of such cost savings improves the competitive position of the merged entity,
which tends to increase wages for the merger participants and lower wages
for the outside firms. However, due to the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of merger
on union rivalry, wages are always lower for the merger participants if they
merge cross-border rather than domestically.
Since a national merger has a potential ‘raising rivals’ cost’ eﬀect (when
non-labour cost savings are not too large) while an international merger al-
ways leads to lower wages for firms not participating in a merger, it is a
priori not clear what would be the equilibrium market structure. It turns
out, though, that the stable equilibrium market structure always implies that
the firms merge internationally. This is the most eﬀective corporate strategy
to reduce union rents, thereby leaving a larger surplus in the downstream
market.
There are numerous examples of multinational firms that exploit the po-
tential for shifting production between plants in diﬀerent countries. In Mar-
ginson and Schulten (1999) it is documented in detail that in such industries
as automobile, electrical consumer products and food manufacturing products
the plants within multinational firms are engaged in internal competition for
both current production and future investments. One example is the Ger-
man car producer BMW, who acquired the British company Rover in 1994
(see Hall, 1998). In 1998 BMW threatened to close down production at the
Rover plant. This led to an agreement where the workers at the Rover plant
accepted a package of measures including the elimination of premium pay-
ments for overtime and Saturday working. Another example is Electrolux, a
Swedish producer of electrical consumer products with plants in many Euro-
pean countries (see Paparella, 1997). It announced in November 1997 that it
planned to restructure production in Europe and close down some plants in its
subsidiary Zanussi in Italy. In December 1997 Electrolux and the trade union
at Zanussi signed an agreement where it was decided that there would be no
plant closures in Italy. The trade union agreed on a package of measures that
included lower wages, for example that newly-recruited workers would receive
a lower wage than the minimum level set by company-level bargaining for the
9This could be called a ‘second source’ argument, even though this is not second sourcing
in a literal sense. The paper in the second source literature that is closest to our model (but
still quite diﬀerent) is Choi and Davidson (2004).
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first two years.10 Norway’s dominant chocolate producer Freia recently intro-
duced night shifts, something the union had resisted for decades. Freia is now
a subsidiary of the US multinational Kraft Foods. The threat that production
could be moved to some other Kraft subsidiary abroad if productivity growth
targets were not met was enough to convince the union.
Many have the impression that the role of unions is strongly in decline,
which presumably would make a theory of union wage responses to mergers
less interesting. However, international evidence is very mixed. OECD (1997)
report union coverage figures for OECD member countries for 1980, 1990 and
1994.11 In 1994 the vast majority of OECD countries still had union coverage
rates above 70%. The relatively few countries with coverage less than 50%
were USA, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Japan. De-unionisation in the
sense of a stark drop in union coverage over the period is only found in the
UK and in New Zealand. Also in the US coverage is sliding downwards,
albeit from a starting point that was very low to begin with. A couple of
countries, notably Australia and Portugal, have experienced sharp falls in
union membership, but without a corresponding change in union coverage.
Leaving the Anglo-American sphere, in Continental Europe and Scandinavia
union coverage is stable and high.12 True, high union coverage does not
necessarily mean that unions are as strong as they were. The theory presented
in this paper is precisely a theory of how some mergers can weaken the position
of trade unions and of how firms seek out precisely those mergers. Note also
that a theory of mergers in international unionised oligopoly can be of interest
also for firms that are based in low union coverage countries. For example,
US multinationals will often be involved in mergers with firms in unionised
countries. To calculate the correct valuation of a possible takeover target in
a unionised country a bidder needs to consider wage responses in the firms in
question and in the rest of the industry.
While firms prefer to merge internationally, it is not obvious that this is
the correct choice from a global or domestic welfare point of view. A wage
reduction is a transfer from workers to employers that by assumption does
not influence social welfare by itself. However, lower wages may in turn lead
to lower product prices. If so, consumers benefit as well. We find that two
international mergers is actually the most preferred market structure from a
global welfare perspective if products are suﬃciently close substitutes — even
if non-labour cost savings are non-existent — implying that there is a perfect
10 In a press release the trade union stated that ‘the agreement means most notably that
the Italian Zanussi plants have managed to avoid being on the international list of cuts
decided by Electrolux’ (see Paparella, 1997).
11Union coverage refers to the percentage of workers covered by a collective agreement,
as opposed to union density that reports the percentage of workers that are members of
unions. In some countries coverage and density diﬀer substantially, with France as the
famous example. There, in 1994, union coverage was 95% while union density was 9%.
12EEAG (2004) gives 2001 figures for union coverage for a somewhat diﬀerent set of
countries. The impression is that union coverage remained stable during the latter half of
the 1990s.
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correspondence between private and social merger incentives in this case. On
the other hand, if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, there will be an
excessive number of international mergers.
Many would argue that the aim of competition authorities is not to max-
imise global social welfare, but rather the domestic social welfare of one’s own
country. A policy maker must then evaluate to what extent a wage cut in
the oligopolised sector is transformed into lower consumer prices rather than
higher profits — and to what extent the relevant consumers and capital owners
reside in the country in question. International mergers may not always be
wanted — in some cases no merger is domestic welfare optimal, in other cases
the preferred outcome is a national merger in the foreign country. Our per-
haps most interesting result is that a domestic merger always is detrimental
to domestic welfare, unless non-labour cost savings with respect to a merger
are suﬃciently high. This questions the idea that lax merger policy towards
domestic firms, to build up a national champion, would be a good substi-
tute for strategic trade policy. Rather, when the non-intervention outcome
needs to be corrected, our analysis points towards strict merger policy both
as pertains domestic and foreign firms as the optimal choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present the structural model and explain the merger formation process. The
union wage eﬀects of merger — the crucial feature of the model — are analysed
and discussed in Section 3. The profitability of a single two-firm merger is
briefly discussed in Section 4, followed by a presentation of the equilibrium
market structure in Section 5. Implications for welfare — global and domestic
— are discussed in Sections 6 and 7. In Section 8 we extend the model to allow
for non-cooperative merger formation. Finally, some concluding remarks are
oﬀered in Section 9.
2 The model
Four ex ante identical firms (owners) are located in two countries, A and B.
Owners 1 and 2 are located in country A, whereas owners 3 and 4 reside in
country B. Each plant produces a specific brand of a diﬀerentiated product,
and firms compete in Cournot fashion in a single integrated market. We
assume that entry to the industry is restricted, due to some firm-specific
ownership advantages of the incumbents.
The market clearing price of brand i is given by the following inverse
demand function:
pi = a− qi − b
X
j
qj , i, j = 1, ...4, i 6= j, (1)
where qi is supplied quantity of brand i, and b ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse mea-
sure of the degree of product diﬀerentiation.13 ,14 Following Singh and Vives
13Only with perfect substitutability can a firm simply move the production of a brand
from one plant to another.
14Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) use a similar demand system, but assume that there
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(1984), this demand structure is derived from the maximisation problem of a
representative consumer whose utility function is given by
U = a
X
i
qi −
1
2
⎛
⎝X
i
q2i + 2b
X
i
X
j
qiqj
⎞
⎠+ z, i, j = 1, ...4; i 6= j, (2)
where z is a numeraire ‘outside’ good.
The goods are produced by using labour and non-labour inputs in a fixed
proportion, where one unit of brand i requires one unit of labour — at the
price wi — and a given amount of non-labour input(s) — at the price c. We
further assume that a firm can reduce its non-labour costs by merging with
another firm. Such exogenous merger synergies are captured by assuming
that marginal production costs for brand i are given by
wi + c(1−Diµ),
where
Di =
½
0 if firm i does not participate in a merger
1 if firm i participates in a merger
,
and µ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the magnitude of the cost synergy. We preserve the ex
ante symmetry of the model by assuming that these synergies can be realised
in a merger between any two firms.
Workers are organised in trade unions. A key assumption of the model is
that workers are not able to organise across borders, nor are trade unions in
diﬀerent countries able credibly to coordinate their wage demands.15 We thus
make the assumption that workers are organised in country-specific industry-
wide unions.16 ,17
We adopt the monopoly union model, where wages in each country are
unilaterally set by the respective trade unions.18 The objective of each trade
are fixed costs associated with establishing brands and that the number of brands is an
endogenously determined choice variable.
15A model that studies possible collusion among trade unions can be found in Straume
(2002).
16An alternative interpretation of the model is that workers are organised in plant-specific
trade unions that coordinate wage setting within — but not across — national borders.
17EEAG (2004) documents that the countries in Western Europe that have high union
coverage also typically have wage formation predominantly at the industry level — or even
more centralised. In contrast, the UK and the former-Communist new entrants to the EU
tend to have wage formation predominantly at the enterprise level. The main mechanism of
the model can survive in such a setting, if enterprise wage formation tends to be coordinated
within the firm nationally after a merger, but not internationally. The details of the model
would, however, be somewhat diﬀerent.
18 In the no-merger starting point this means that all firms are unionised and all unions
are equally strong. The theory in this paper is not one of capital flight to non-unionised
low-cost countries, but of multinationals playing equally strong unions out against each
other.
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union is to maximise total rents for its members19,20, implying the following
utility functions for the trade unions in countries A and B, respectively:
VA = (w1 − w)n1 + (w2 − w)n2, (3)
VB = (w3 −w)n3 + (w4 − w)n4, (4)
where wi (ni) is the wage (employment) level at plant i, and w is the outside
wage (that can be earned outside the oligopoly industry), assumed to be equal
in both countries. Note that each trade union is allowed to set diﬀerent wages
at diﬀerent plants.
Finally, profits associated with the sale of brand i are given by21
πi = [pi − wi − c (1−Diµ)]ni, i = 1, ...4. (5)
The game is characterised by the following sequence of moves:22
• Stage 1: The equilibrium ownership structure of the industry is deter-
mined through bargaining between the owners.
• Stage 2: The trade unions simultaneously and independently set wages.
• Stage 3: The firms simultaneously and independently set quantities.
Merger formation. The ownership structure of the industry is assumed
to be formed through a cooperative game of coalition-formation. We make the
19Already Dunlop (1944) noted that an economic theory of trade unions would have to
start with the assumption that unions maximise something. The rent-seeking assumption
is widely used as a simple union maximand. If workers are risk-neutral it coincides with the
idea of a utilitarian union that maximises the weighted sum of its members’ utilities. See
Oswald’s (1985) famous survey for a discussion of union objectives. Moreover, Pemberton
(1988) shows that a rent-maximising union also is equivalent to a ‘managerial union’ with
union leaders who are interested in size (employment) and union members (represented by
the median worker) who are interested in excess wages, where the leadership and workers
have equal bargaining power.
20An Editor has pointed out that it is important for subsequent results that the cross-
derivative of the union maximand as regards wage and employment is not negative. We
know of no example of a union utility function that has been used in theoretical or empricial
work that opens up the possibility of a negative cross-derivative. If a union utility function
is written down free-hand, of course any sign of the cross-derivative is possible. But union
utility functions are routinely based on some assumption about how the union utility func-
tion came about. Take for example the idea that the union utility function is a utilitarian
welfare function over its members’ utilities. Then ‘employment’ is not a commodity that
yields utility in itself, but simply the number of people that get utility from money. This
limits what the above-mentioned cross-derivative can be.
21 In order to ensure an interior solution, with non-negative profits for all firms in every
possible market structure, we assume that c < 1
2
(a− w).
22We implicitly picture that international ‘liberalisation’ of the markets just took place,
and that there were pre-liberalisation national bans on merger-to-monopoly. The starting-
point then is four independent firms.
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assumption that only two-firm mergers are allowed.23 Each production plant
continues to exist after a merger, and it is not possible to move the production
of one brand from one plant to another, so the quintessence of a merger is
coordination on output decisions among the participating units. With two-
firm mergers, we are left with 6 possible market structures, comprising a
combined total of 10 possible ownership structures, that could emerge as
an equilibrium outcome. Labelling country A as the ‘domestic’ country, we
introduce the following notation to distinguish between the diﬀerent market
structures:
1. No merger: M0 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
2. One domestic (national) merger: MdN = {12, 3, 4}
3. One foreign (national) merger: MfN = {1, 2, 34}
4. Two national mergers: MNN = {12, 34}
5. One international merger: MI = {13, 2, 4}, M 0I = {14, 2, 3}, M 00I =
{1, 23, 4}, M 000I = {1, 24, 3}
6. Two international mergers: MII = {13, 24}, M 0II = {14, 23}
The solution procedure is based on Horn and Persson (2001a), who treat
the merger process as a cooperative game of coalition-formation, where the
players are free to communicate and write binding contracts. Owners that
agree on a merger can decide on any division of the firm’s profits, but pay-
ments between coalitions are not allowed. The approach then involves a com-
parison of any two possible ownership structures Mi and Mj , where Mi is
said to dominate Mj if the combined profits of the decisive group of owners
are larger in Mi than in Mj . The decisive group of owners are the owners
that are expected to be able to influence whether Mi will be formed instead
of Mj , and vice versa. Given the above assumptions, owners belonging to
identical coalitions in the two structures cannot aﬀect whether Mj will be
formed instead of Mi, but all remaining owners can influence this choice and
are thus decisive.24
To give a brief illustration of the main ideas in the model, consider a
comparison between the no-merger structure (M0) and the market structure
with one domestic merger (MdN ). In this case owners 3 and 4 stand alone in
both structures, so the decisive owners are the merger participants inMdN , i.e.,
owners 1 and 2, and dominance relation is determined by whether or not the
merger is profitable for the participants. Now consider instead a comparison
23 It is straightforward but space-consuming to extend the model to allow for mergers
that include three production units. Three-firm mergers are more likely to be blocked by
competition authorites, and the present focus on two-firm mergers also makes the distinction
between national and international merger more succint. The two-firm mergers assumption
also contains an assumption that merger-to-monopoly is banned.
24See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
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between a domestic and an international merger, say between MdN and MI .
For MdN to dominate MI it is not enough that (the domestic) owners 1 and 2
prefer MdN over MI . If owner 3 is adversely aﬀected by the formation of M
d
N ,
this owner may want to persuade owner 1 to form MI instead, by oﬀering a
large share of the surplus in this structure. Thus, three owners (1,2 and 3)
are decisive, and the dominance relation is determined by a comparison of
total profits for these three owners in the two ownership structures.
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are in the
core — i.e., the structures that are undominated — are defined as Equilibrium
Ownership Structures (EOS), which then determine the Equilibrium Market
Structure (EMS).
3 Market structures and union wages
In this Section we present a detailed analysis of union wage responses to dif-
ferent market structures, which to a large extent determines the outcome of
the bargaining game between owners. Due to the symmetric nature of the
model, we can ease notation by introducing the following notational short-
hand: in market structures that involve one or more mergers, wkm and w
k
o
refer to the equilibrium wage level for a merger participant and an outsider,
respectively, in market structure Mk. Similar notation is used for other equi-
librium variables throughout the paper. Variables without subscript refer to
the symmetric no-merger equilibrium.
Since equilibrium wages depend on the characteristics of the market struc-
ture, a merger yields potentially both exogenous and endogenous cost syn-
ergies. As will be shown below, the wage eﬀects of mergers are also related
the magnitude of non-labour cost savings. However, for clarity of exposition,
we will start out by discussing the case of no exogenous cost synergies, i.e.,
µ = 0. By a comparison of equilibrium wage expressions for diﬀerent market
structures, with µ = 0, we derive the following result:25
Proposition 1. (µ = 0) : wNNm > w
N
o > w
N
m > w
0 > wIo > w
I
m > w
II
m
Without exogenous merger synergies, there exists an unambiguous ranking
of market structures with respect to union wages. Furthermore, using the
no-merger structure as a benchmark, a clear pattern arises: union wages
are higher in any market structure involving national merger(s), whereas the
opposite is true in market structures involving international merger(s).26
25Expressions for equilibrium wages, employment and profits in each market structure are
reported in Appendix A.
26These results are related to Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (forthcoming), who dis-
cuss how downstream mergers might influence the prices charged by upstream firms with
market power. A trade union can be seen as such an ‘upstream input supplier’. In that pa-
per we point out that the main results, broadly speaking, carries over to models with wage
bargaining (rather than wage setting) and/or Bertrand competition. Even though there
are diﬀerences between the models — the present one being made specifically to portray an
international oligopoly — the main mechanisms of the models are similar, so we expect this
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The intuition behind these results can be found through a more careful
scrutiny of the unions’ maximisation problem. Consider the first-order con-
ditions for optimal wage setting by the trade union in country A, given by
ni (·) + (wi − w) ∂ni (·)∂wi + (wj − w)
∂nj (·)
∂wi
= 0, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j, (6)
where ni (·) is the derived labour demand at firm i. Obviously, the first-
order conditions for optimal wage setting by the trade union in country B are
completely equivalent.
From (6) we see that the relationship between market structures and union
wages potentially works through two diﬀerent channels. Mergers aﬀect the
wage level at firm i insofar as either the demand for labour or the wage
responsiveness of labour demand (the slope of the labour demand curve) —
evaluated at the pre-merger equilibrium wage level — changes as a result of
the merger. More specifically, a reduction (increase) in labour demand, or
more (less) wage responsive labour demand, induces the trade union to set a
lower wage.
For comparative purposes the labour demand of firm i in M0 is given by
n0i (·) =
(2− b) (a− c)− 2 (1 + b)wi + b
P
j 6=iwj
4 + 4b− 3b2 , i = 1, ...4. (7)
On the other hand, labour demand for merger participants and outside firms
in a market structure with one merger are given by27
nkm (·) =
(2− b) (a− c) + (2 + b)µc− (1+b)(2−b)(1−b) wm +
2b
(1−b)w−m + b
P
wo
2 (2 + 3b− b2) ,
(8)
nko (·) =
2 (a− c (1 + bµ))− 2(2+2b−b
2)
(2−b) wo +
2b
(2−b)w−o + b
P
wm
2 (2 + 3b− b2) , (9)
k = N, I. In market structures with two mergers, labour demand for a merger
participant is given by28
nkm (·) =
2 (a− c (1− µ))− (2+b(2−b))(1−b) wm +
b(2+b)
(1−b) w−m + b
P
wm0
4 (1 + 2b)
, (10)
k = NN, II.
Consider first the wage eﬀects of a national merger. A merger reduces the
degree of product market competition. With no exogenous cost synergies, this
naturally causes labour demand to fall for the merger participants. However,
to be true also in this framwork. Our earlier paper has no mention of welfare analysis, which
is of central interest here.
27The pairs of merger participants and outside firms are labelled (m,−m) and (o,−o),
respectively.
28The pairs of merger participants are labelled (m,−m) and (m0,−m0).
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reduced product market competition also implies that the equilibrium market
shares of firms are less responsive to wage changes, which — since each trade
union controls both wm and w−m in market structures with national mergers
— translates directly into less wage responsive labour demand for each trade
union. This is easily confirmed by a comparison between (7) and (8)-(10).
When labour demand gets less wage responsive, the trade unions respond by
increasing wages, and this eﬀect always dominates the eﬀect of a merger on
total labour demand.29 Naturally, this eﬀect is also stronger in the market
structure with two national mergers.
In the case of just one national merger, Proposition 1 confirms that wages
are lower in the country of the merger participants. This is due to the eﬀect
of the merger on labour demand for the merging and non-merging firms,
respectively. At the pre-merger wages, the merged firm has an incentive to
cut back on production, which implies a reduction of labour demand. The
outside firms — being free-riders on the merger — have opposite incentives. In
fact, comparing (8) and (9) at the no-merger equilibrium, with µ = 0, we find
that nkm =
¡
1− b2
¢
nko . This labour demand eﬀect causes wages to be lower
for the merged firm, and the eﬀect is stronger the less diﬀerentiated products
are. Consequently, there is a ‘raising rivals’ costs’ eﬀect of a national merger
in this case.
Now consider an international merger. The crucial feature of such a merger
is that the merged firm is able to scale up production at one plant and down
at the other, and the two plants involved rely on labour supply from diﬀerent
trade unions. When the trade unions are not able to control both wm and
w−m, this means that labour demand from each plant of the merged firm gets
more responsive to wage diﬀerentials between the two trade unions. The result
is lower wages for the internationally merged firm. The strength of this eﬀect
depends on the substitutability of products in demand. The less diﬀerentiated
the products are, the more intense is the merger-induced competition between
the trade unions. From (8) we see that limb→1
¡
∂nIm/∂wm
¢
→ −∞, implying
that all union rents will be competed away in the merged firms if products
are homogeneous.
In market structures with just one international merger, wages will also
decrease for the outside firms, compared with the case of no merger. This is a
labour demand eﬀect. Since ∂nko/∂wm > 0, lower wages for the merged firm
will reduce labour demand at the non-merged firms. Consequently, the trade
unions will respond by lowering wages also for firms not participating in the
merger. Obviously, this eﬀect is also stronger the less diﬀerentiated products
are.
Exogenous merger synergies. How does the presence of exogenous
cost synergies influence the wage eﬀects of mergers? From (8)-(10) we see
that non-labour cost synergies aﬀect total labour demand in an unambiguous
29This eﬀect of reduced product market competition on the wage sensitivity of labour
demand is also identified, in a somewhat diﬀerent setting, by Dowrick (1989).
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manner. More specifically, we see that
∂nkm (·)
∂µ
> 0 and
∂nko (·)
∂µ
< 0.
The intuition is relatively straightforward. Non-labour merger synergies im-
plies a reduction of marginal production costs. Ceteris paribus, the profit-
maximising response by the merged firm is to increase production, which
implies an increase in the demand for labour. In the case of one merger, the
outside firms are aﬀected through the improved competitive position of the
merged firm. Since production quantities are strategic substitutes, exogenous
merger synergies will — ceteris paribus — lead to a reduction of labour demand
for the outside firms. Since µ does not aﬀect the slope of the labour demand
curves, the (partial) eﬀects of non-labour cost savings on union wages follow
immediately: wages increase for the merger participants and decrease for the
outside firms.
When allowing for exogenous merger synergies we can no longer make an
unambiguous ranking of market structure with respect to equilibrium wages.
However, a relatively clear pattern can still be established:
Proposition 2. (i) wNm > wi for all µ ∈ [0, 1] , (ii) wi > wIm if µ < µ :=
(4+b)(2−b)b(a−c−w)
8c(1−b)(4−b) , (iii) min
©
wNm, w
NN
m
ª
> max
©
wIm, w
II
m
ª
for all µ ∈
[0, 1] .
Parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition show the wage eﬀect of a national
and an international merger, respectively. A national merger always leads to
increased wages for the merger participants. In fact, since ∂wkm/∂µ > 0, the
presence of non-labour synergies reinforces the wage eﬀect already established
in Proposition 1. For an international merger, on the other hand, the opposite
holds true. In this case, the presence of non-labour cost savings introduce
two opposing forces on union wage responses to a merger. An international
merger thus leads to higher wages for the merger participants if non-labour
cost savings are suﬃciently large. Since the union-rivalry eﬀect is increasing
in b, an international merger is more likely to result in higher wages when
products are more diﬀerentiated. Furthermore, a certain degree of product
diﬀerentiation is necessary for the non-labour cost savings eﬀect to dominate
the union rivalry eﬀect. Indeed, we see that limb→0 µ→ 0 and limb→1 µ→∞.
Part (iii) of the Proposition contains the most important result of this
Section, though. It confirms that — when comparing market structures with
national and international merger(s) — wages for the merger participants are
always lower when they merge internationally. Both types of merger may
cause wages to rise, but, when compared with national mergers, the intensi-
fied inter-union rivalry brought about by cross-border mergers always has a
dampening eﬀect on wages for the merger participants.
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4 Merger profitability and free-rider eﬀects
Before deriving the equilibrium of the endogenous merger game, it is instruc-
tive to consider how a merger aﬀects profits for merger participants and out-
side firms. In order to place the model in a relevant context, we can relate
our analysis to two basic findings in the existing merger literature.
First, with exogenous (and linear) production costs we know that a cer-
tain degree of product diﬀerentiation is necessary in order to make a two-firm
merger in Cournot oligopoly profitable (see, e.g., Deneckere and Davidson,
1985, and Lommerud and Sørgard, 1997). In a Cournot model, a merger with-
out cost savings will lead the merging parties to contract their output, while
outsiders expand. The more diﬀerentiated products are, the less the merged
unit loses market share to outsiders, and for suﬃcient diﬀerentiation a merger
is profitable even in the Cournot case. Second, a purely anti-competitive
merger (which yields no cost synergies) is typically more profitable for firms
not participating in the merger. This free-rider eﬀect is frequently referred to
as the ‘merger paradox’ (see also Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983).
Consider first the eﬀect of a single international merger. Using the no-
merger equilibrium as a benchmark, a straightforward comparison of equilib-
rium profits (see Appendix A) produces the following result:
Proposition 3. (i) πIm > π
0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1], (ii) πIm > πIo for all µ ∈ [0, 1],
(iii) π0 > πIo if µ > bµ := (20−b2)(1−b)b(a−c−w)12(2−b)(3b+2)c .
An international merger is always profitable for the participants, even if
µ = 0. This is of course due to the wage eﬀect of such a merger. As shown
in the previous Section, the wage reduction is larger the less diﬀerentiated
products are, which helps explain why this eﬀect is suﬃciently large to make
an international merger profitable for every degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Furthermore, it is always more profitable to take part in an international
merger, rather than being an outsider, implying that the ‘merger paradox’ is
not a feature of an international merger in our model. Indeed, if there are
additional non-labour cost synergies from a merger (i.e., µ > 0) an interna-
tional merger may actually be harmful for outside firms, as indicated by part
(iii) of the Proposition. We see that bµ = 0 if b = 1, implying that µ > 0
is a suﬃcient condition for outside firms to lose profits from the merger if
products are homogeneous.
[Figure 1 about here]
The profitability of a national merger, on the other hand, is not easily
characterised analytically. Instead, we illustrate the profit eﬀects of such a
merger in Figure 1, for some given parameter values. The diﬀerent areas in
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the Figure are defined as follows
A : πNm < π
0 < πNo ,
B : π0 < πNm < π
N
o ,
C : π0 < πNo < π
N
m,
D : πNo < π
0 < πNm.
We observe the following general pattern: a higher degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation and larger non-labour cost savings increase the likelihood of a national
merger being profitable (B+C+D), a national merger being more profitable
for the participants than for outside firms (C+D), and a national merger re-
ducing the profits of outside firms (D). The eﬀect of non-labour cost savings
from the merger is obvious. In the absence of such cost savings, a national
merger can still be profitable, provided that the benefit of output coordination
outweighs the wage increase following such a merger. This is the case if prod-
ucts are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, which reduces the possibility of outsiders
to free-ride on the merger.30
5 Equilibrium market structure
We now turn to the equilibrium solution of the full game. A comparison of the
relevant profit expressions along the line of the solution procedure sketched
in Section 2.1 yields the following unambiguous result:
Proposition 4. The equilibrium market structure is two international mergers
for all parameter configurations.
Proof. We can show thatMII dominates all other market structures, making
it the unique equilibrium market structure. Due to the symmetry of
the model, the dominance relations are determined by the following
conditions: MII dom MI if πIIm > π
I
o; MII dom M0 if π
II
m > π
0; MII
dom MNN if πIIm > π
NN
m ; MII dom MN if 2π
II
m > π
NN
m + π
NN
o . The
fulfillment of these conditions is confirmed by straightforward algebra.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this result is naturally related to the wage eﬀects
of diﬀerent types of merger. Regarding the firms’ choice between merging
domestically or internationally, the market structure with two international
mergers dominates any market structure involving national merger(s) if the
former structure yields higher industry profits. This is, in turn, dependent on
how diﬀerent types of merger aﬀects the power struggle between employers
and workers. As we have shown in Section 3, the eﬀective market power of
30Diﬀerent parameter configurations would produce a picture that is qualitatively similar
to Figure 1. It is easily shown that, for µ = 0, the sign of equilibrium profit diﬀerences are
independent of the parameters a, c and w. For µ > 0, numerical simulations suggest that
the curves in Figure 1 never cross in the valid (µ, b) -space.
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trade unions is lower when firms merge internationally rather than domesti-
cally, which implies that a larger share of the oligopoly rents is extracted by
the firms in the former case.31
Furthermore, for two international mergers to constitute an equilibrium
market structure, the second merger must be privately profitable. For low
degrees of product diﬀerentiation, and in the eventual absence of non-labour
cost savings, this requires that the merger produces a suﬃcient saving of
wage costs. Since the trade unions will keep wages relatively high in firms
that are not internationally merged, there is always a suﬃcient potential for
wage cost savings to make the second international merger profitable for the
participants.
Obviously, due to the symmetry of the model, there are multiple equilibria,
where the equilibrium market structure is the set of two ownership structures,
in both of which all owners merge internationally.
6 Global welfare
In regard to social welfare the analysis of the previous Section immediately
raises the following question: will the ‘merger market forces’ lead to socially
desirable market structures? The answer to this question is obviously impor-
tant in determining the optimal framing of merger policy in open economies,
and in this Section we will highlight the implications for global welfare — de-
fined as the sum of consumers’ surplus, profits and union utility — by making
a social ranking of market structures. Formally, global welfare in market
structure Mk is given by
Wk = Uk −
4X
i=1
pki q
k
i +
4X
i=1
πki + V
k
A + V
k
B (11)
which simplifies to
Wk = Uk − [w + c(1−Diµ)]
4X
i=1
nki . (12)
Note that the welfare function weighs incomes of diﬀerent groups in so-
ciety equally. Wage payments and payments for goods therefore appear as
mere transfers of money that do not influence social welfare. In consequence,
welfare is decided solely by the value to consumers of the goods produced less
the opportunity costs of the labour and non-labour resources used as inputs.
A comparison of global welfare in the diﬀerent market structures yields
the following key results:
31 It should be noted that, by assuming a global market, a potentially important impli-
cation of domestic mergers is ignored. If domestic markets were partially protected by
trade costs, the market power eﬀect might make domestic mergers more profitable. See also
Horn and Persson (2001b) for an analysis of domestic versus international merger — in a
non-unionised setting — in the presence of trade costs and segmented markets.
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Proposition 5. (i) MII is always socially preferable to any market structure
involving national merger(s), (ii) MII is the socially optimal market
structure for all µ ∈ [0, 1] if b > 0.56.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The first part of the Proposition implies that national mergers are never
socially optimal, from a viewpoint of global welfare. Such mergers may in-
crease global welfare, if non-labour cost synergies are suﬃciently large, but
market structures involving national merger(s) are always socially dominated
by the market structure with two international mergers. Furthermore, two
international mergers is the socially optimal market structure if the degree of
product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, regardless of the size of non-labour
cost savings. A comparison between Proposition 4 and 5 reveals a perfect
correspondence between private and social merger incentives for this case of
relatively homogeneous goods.
The reason why international mergers can be socially optimal here — even if
µ = 0 — while they would not be in a model with exogenous production costs, is
that the power struggle between labour and capital not only lower wages, but
consumer prices may fall as a result. Since national mergers have no such eﬀect
on wages, rather the opposite, they will never be socially preferable unless
non-labour cost synergies are suﬃciently large. But even if these synergies
are large enough to make national mergers welfare improving, the eﬃciency
gains from international mergers are always larger, due to the union wage
eﬀects.
An illustration of how the socially optimal market structure depends on
the key parameters b and µ is given in Figure 2 for a specific numerical
example. We see that MII is the socially optimal market structure if the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low (b > 0.56) or non-labour
merger synergies are suﬃciently large. In this specific example, non-labour
cost savings of more than 2 percent are suﬃcient to make MII the optimal
structure for every degree of product diﬀerentiation.
[Figure 2 about here]
On the other hand, if the exogenous merger synergy is non-existent, or
very low, the socially optimal market structure is determined by the degree
of product diﬀerentiation. For intermediate levels of diﬀerentiation, one in-
ternational merger is socially preferable, whereas any merger reduces global
welfare if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. The intuition is relatively
straightforward: if µ = 0, mergers can improve welfare only if they lead to
reduced consumer prices, at least for some brands. We know that only cross-
border mergers can lead to such price reductions, provided that wages are
suﬃciently reduced as a result of the merger(s). More specifically, the wage
reductions must outweigh the eﬀect of increased market concentration. Since
the strength of the wage eﬀect is decreasing in the degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation, the market concentration eﬀect is more likely to dominate the wage
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eﬀect the more diﬀerentiated products are. Consequently, MI and M0 are so-
cially optimal for intermediate and low levels of diﬀerentiation, respectively.
7 Domestic welfare
The evaluation of diﬀerent market structures from a perspective of domestic
welfare may diﬀer significantly from evaluations with respect to global wel-
fare.32 In order to analyse the impact of mergers on domestic welfare we
make a couple of additional assumptions. First, we assume that domestic
consumers’ surplus constitutes a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of global consumers’ sur-
plus. Second, we assume that profits are divided evenly between the owners
taking part in a merger.33 Domestic welfare in market structure Mk is then
given by
WAk =
2X
i=1
πki + V
k
A + α
Ã
U −
4X
i=1
pki q
k
i
!
, (13)
[Figure 3 about here]
Consider first the case of no exogenous cost savings from a merger. Figure
3 depicts the pattern of the most preferred market structure in the (b, α) plane
when µ = 0.34 By comparing Figures 2 and 3, we see that there is no conflict
between domestic and global interests, from a welfare point of view, as long as
a suﬃciently high share of consumers reside in the domestic country. The do-
mestically optimal market structure is then one (two) international merger(s)
for intermediate (high) levels of product diﬀerentiation, and no merger other-
wise, precisely as a concern for global welfare would dictate. However, if α is
suﬃciently low the domestically most preferred market structure is a foreign
national merger, which harms consumers, but benefits domestic firms and
workers through higher wages, employment and profits.
[Figure 4 about here]
An equivalent illustration for the case of a 5 percent non-labour merger
synergy is provided in Figure 4 for a specific numerical example. Again,
comparing with Figure 2 — which is based on the same numerical example — we
see that the presence of non-labour cost savings increase the correspondence
between domestic and global interests. From both perspectives, the optimal
market structure is two international mergers, unless a relatively low share of
32Konrad and Lommerud (2001) warn that any preferential treatment of domestic firms
can be manipulated in the following sense: foreign owners may sell their assets to domestic
owners who then receive favourable treatment, but this only makes the domestic buyers
willing to pay a higher price for the assets in question, so the real beneficiaries are the
original foreign owners.
33With the geographic distribution of owners fixed, α of course becomes a measure of the
extent to which consumers relative to capital owners reside in the home country.
34When µ = 0, the parameters a, w and c can be factored out of the welfare expressions,
implying that the social ranking of diﬀerent market structures does not depend on the
numerical values of these parameters.
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consumers reside in the domestic country and products are suﬃciently close
substitutes in demand. In the latter case, a foreign national merger is still
the most preferred structure, from a domestic point of view.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a potential conflict, though, when it comes to
coordination of domestic antitrust policies across diﬀerent countries, partic-
ularly for the case of non-existent or very low non-labour merger synergies.
Assume that a large share of the consumers, say α = 0.8, reside in country
A, and consider the case of µ = 0. In this case, the most preferred mar-
ket structure for country A is one (two) international merger(s) if the degree
of product diﬀerentiation is intermediate (high), and no merger otherwise.
However, if 80 per cent of consumers live in country A then at most 20 per
cent of consumers in this market live in country B, and this country would
consequently prefer a foreign national merger.
Finally, we want to highlight the eﬀect of a domestic merger on domestic
welfare. Under which circumstances will such a merger improve domestic
welfare?
Proposition 6. There exists µ > 0 such that a domestic merger is detrimental
to domestic welfare when µ < µ.
The proof lies in a straightforward evaluation of WAN(d)−WA0 and WANN −
WAN(f).
Assume that there are no exogenous merger synergies, i.e., µ = 0. In this
case, the Proposition implies that if national competition policy is governed
by considerations for domestic welfare, as defined by (13), the antitrust au-
thorities should never allow a domestic merger. This holds even if α = 0,
which means that the proposed merger’s eﬀect on consumers’ surplus is ir-
relevant for domestic welfare. Thus, even if a domestic merger is profitable,
the decrease in domestic union rents, due to a loss of employment, more than
outweighs the increase in profits. Such a merger benefits domestic welfare
only if non-labour cost savings are suﬃciently large. Note also that it can
be shown that even when a domestic merger is welfare improving, it will still
not be part of the most preferred market structure from a domestic welfare
viewpoint, in line with figures 3 and 4.
For the case of µ = 0, this result mirrors the result in Brander and Spencer
(1985). They found that a government should pay a subsidy to a domestic
firm operating in a foreign Cournot market. The subsidy is a commitment
device which helps the firm to behave more aggressively and shift profits to its
own country. In our setting, a national merger results in higher wages, which
is the opposite of paying a subsidy to the firm. This implies that the Cournot
firm operating in a foreign market is committed to act less aggressively when
it faces higher wages after the merger, thereby reducing the combined sum of
profits and union rent. This result questions the idea that lax domestic merger
policy can substitute for strategic trade policy or other activist industrial
policies to build up national champions. The above reasoning tells us that the
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non-intervention market structure outcome may not be the domestic welfare
optimal one. But if there is a problem, the problem is too many international
mergers, not that one would want domestic mergers instead of international
ones. Strict merger policy towards all kinds of mergers should then be the
choice, not lax merger policy only for domestic mergers.
8 Non-cooperative merger formation
In the previous analysis we applied a cooperative merger formation model first
introduced in Horn and Persson (2001a). In many markets, though, merger
formation resembles a non-cooperative game. For example, firms merge as a
result of an acquisition. In this Section we introduce two simple versions of
a non-cooperative acquisition game, and compare our results with the ones
reported in Section 5. In line with the previous analysis, we restrict the
attention to two-firm mergers, i.e., one firm acquiring only one other firm.
First, let us consider a sequential acquisition game, which is played in two
stages according to the following rules: at each stage, one firm is given the
role as an initial bidder.35 It decides to bid or not on a target firm of its own
choice. If it bids, then other firms not already involved in an acquisition can
also bid for the target. We assign firm 1 the role of initial bidder at stage
1. It decides whether or not to make a bid, and chooses the target firm if it
decides to bid. Furthermore, firm 2 is the initial bidder at stage 2 if it was
not the target at stage 1. Otherwise, firm 3 is the initial bidder at stage 2.
If a firm is indiﬀerent between bidding and not bidding, we assume that the
firm bids. The game is illustrated in Figure 5, where we have specified the
profits for the bidder and the target, respectively. Note that when there are
two acquisitions, the profits of the stage 2 bidder and target are listed before
the corresponding stage 1 profits.
[Figure 5 about here]
In Appendix B we show that the outcome of such an acquisition game
is two international acquisitions, which is identical to the outcome of the
cooperative merger model. This should not be a surprise. As shown in the
previous Sections, the firms that merge internationally will always be better
oﬀ, and it is always better to be an insider than an outsider. Note, though,
that in this particular setting the target firm at stage 1 and the bidder firm
at stage 2 are the ones with the highest profit. The latter firm gains from no
competition from other bidders, while the target firm at stage 1 gains from
competition for being an acquiring firm at stage 1 and thereby avoiding being
a target at stage 2. However, the two remaining firms (the bidder at stage
1 and the target at stage 2) are also better oﬀ compared with the case if no
acquisitions at all.
35Both in this game and the subsequent simultaneous game one could imagine an initial
stage where there were a lottery of which role each firm should have. This would preserve
the symmetry of the model, and all firms would have the same ex ante profit.
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Second, let us also consider a simultaneous acquisition game. To simplify,
we assign the roles as bidders to firms 1 and 3. They decide simultaneously
whether or not to make bids for the two target firms. Each of the acquiring
firms can bid on both target firms (2 and 4), but one bidder can only acquire
one firm. As we show in Appendix B, the equilibrium outcome of this game
is also two international acquisitions. Each target firm receives the profits
it could have earned by turning down the oﬀer, while the two bidding firms
capture the remaining profits generated by two international acquisitions.
We summarise our result as follows:
Proposition 7. Two international acquisitions is the equilibrium outcome of
the described non-cooperative acquisition games.
9 Some concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored how the presence of trade union power can
aﬀect the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly. A core idea is that
a merger triggers wage changes. Our model can then be seen as a merger
model with endogenous costs. But in contrast to the received literature, a
merger may aﬀect costs for all firms in the industry.36 This has important
implications for merger policy. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) argued that a
suﬃcient criterion for a merger to improve welfare is that it leads to lower
product prices. They propose a simple criterion for when a merger results in
lower product prices.37 It specifies how large the reduction in the merging
firm’s marginal costs must be for consumer prices to fall. If the merging
firm lowers product prices, the non-merging firm is expected to do the same.
However, our results illustrate that such a criterion can be misleading, because
marginal costs change for the non-merging firms as well. One cannot consider
only the merging firm’s pricing decision to tell whether consumers benefit
or not. For example, with an international merger one could have that the
merging firm sets a higher output price while the non-merging firm sets a lower
output price. By using the Farrell and Shapiro criterion for that particular
example one would only concentrate on the merged firm’s price increase and
forget the outside firm’s price cut. In fact, the output price of a non-merging
firm may change even if the output price of the merging firm does not.
According to our predictions, a national merger is expected to lead to
higher wages, while an international merger is expected to have the opposite
eﬀect on wages, at least if non-labour cost savings are not too large. It is an
empirical question whether this in fact happens. Unfortunately, there are no
empirical studies that tests for the wage eﬀect of an international versus a
national merger. One recent study, though, can shed some light on the issue.
36The first study that introduced internal cost savings following a merger was Perry and
Porter (1985). A merger resulted in an internal change in how firms operated their crucial
assets. It triggered lower marginal costs, but only for the merged firm.
37Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider only an industry with identical products. Werden
(1996) extends their criterion to the case of an industry with diﬀerentiated products.
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Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) test empirically how mergers aﬀect employment.
They found that in the UK a domestic merger reduces employment by much
more than cross border deals made by UK acquiring firms. This is consistent
with a prediction saying that national mergers are more wage-increasing than
cross-border mergers. However, one should be careful with the interpretation
of their results since their study is not tailored to test the predictions from
our theory.38 This calls for more detailed empirical studies. The structure
of the labour market should be taken into account when testing directly for
wage eﬀects following diﬀerent kinds of mergers. This is an issue for future
research.
Finally, it is important to stress that our conclusions are reached within a
fairly stylised modelling framework. Thus, we cannot claim a high degree of
generality for all of our results. However, the main contribution of our paper is
the identification of certain mechanisms that might be important in explaining
merger patterns in unionised international oligopolies; in essence, how cross-
border merger might be an eﬀective mechanism for firms to curtail trade
union power, and thereby obtaining wage cost savings. These mechanisms are
related to demand substitutability of products, and thus indirectly labour, and
clearly generalise beyond the linear specification of demand and cost functions.
On the other hand, the precise implications of these wage eﬀects, with respect
to merger profitability and welfare, obviously depend on the relative strengths
of diﬀerent opposing forces, which are determined by the exact specification
of market structure, technology and preferences.
Appendix A
Equilibrium expressions for employment, wages and profits in the diﬀerent
market structures follow.
No merger (M0). Equilibrium employment, wages and profits for a firm
in M0 are given by
n0 =
(2 + b) (a− c−w)
4 (2 + 3b)
, (A.1)
w0 =
1
4
[(2− b) (a− c) + w (2 + b)] , (A.2)
38There are some potential problems relating their study to our predictions. First, there
are no direct link between employment eﬀects and wage changes. For example, a cutback
in employment can be a pure synergy eﬀect and will not necessarily mirror a wage change.
Second, in the empirical study there are no data to control for the structure of the labour
market. Third, when comparing national and international mergers they do not distinguish
between related and unrelated mergers. Only in the former we expect that market power in
the product market matters. Note also that for Continental Europe they found only minor
diﬀerences in the employment eﬀect of national and international mergers. In addition, as
pointed out by the Editor, there is also a potential problem of selection-bias in such studies,
as firms choose to merger cross-border, as opposed to domestically, which may influence the
wage eﬀects.
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π0 =
(a− c− w)2 (b+ 2)2
16 (3b+ 2)2
. (A.3)
One national merger (MN). Equilibrium employment, wages and prof-
its for merger participants and outsiders in MN are given by
nNm =
(2 + b)
£¡
2 + 2b− b2
¢
(a− c− w) + µc (2 + 3b)
¤
2 (2 + 3b− b2) (4 + 6b+ b2) , (A.4)
nNo =
(1 + b)
£¡
4 + 4b− b2
¢
(a− c− w)− µcb (2 + b)
¤
2 (2 + 3b− b2) (4 + 6b+ b2) , (A.5)
wNm =
¡
2 + 2b− b2
¢
(a− c) + 2w (1 + b)2 + µc (2 + 3b)
4 + 6b+ b2
, (A.6)
wNo =
¡
4 + 4b− b2
¢
(a− c) + w (2 + b) (2 + 3b)− µcb (2 + b)
2 (4 + 6b+ b2)
, (A.7)
πNm =
(2 + b)2 (1 + b)
£¡
2 + 2b− b2
¢
(a− c− w) + µc (2 + 3b)
¤2
4 (4 + 6b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
, (A.8)
πNo =
(b+ 1)2
£¡
4 + 4b− b2
¢
(a− c− w)− µcb (b+ 2)
¤2
4 (4 + 6b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
, (A.9)
Two national mergers (MNN). Equilibrium employment, wages and
profits for a merger participant in MNN are given by
nNNm =
(1 + b) [a− w − c (1− µ)]
2 (1 + 2b) (2 + b)
, (A.10)
wNNm =
a+ w (1 + b)− c (1− µ)
2 + b
, (A.11)
πNNm =
[a− w − c (1− µ)]2 (1 + b)3
4 (2 + b)2 (1 + 2b)2
. (A.12)
One international merger (MI). Equilibrium employment, wages and
profits for merger participants and outsiders in MI are given by
nIm =
(2− b)
£¡
8− b2
¢
(a− c− w) + cµ
¡
8 + 6b− b2
¢¤
2 (2 + 3b− b2) (16− 12b+ b2) , (A.13)
nIo =
(4− b)
¡
2− b2
¢
(a− c− w)− µc3b (2− b)
(2 + 3b− b2) (16− 12b+ b2) , (A.14)
wIm =
2 (1− b) [2 (2− b) (a− c) + µc (4− b)] + w
¡
8− 3b2
¢
16− 12b+ b2 , (A.15)
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wIo =
(2− b) [(4− 3b) (a− c)− µcb] + 2w
¡
4− b− b2
¢
16− 12b+ b2 , (A.16)
πIm =
(2− b)2 (1 + b)
£¡
8− b2
¢
(a− c− w) + µc
¡
8 + 6b− b2
¢¤2
4 (16− 12b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
, (A.17)
πIo =
£
(4− b)
¡
2− b2
¢
(a− c− w)− 3µcb (2− b)
¤2
(16− 12b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
. (A.18)
Two international mergers (MII). Equilibrium employment, wages
and profits for a merger participant in MII are given by
nIIm =
(2 + b) [a− w − c (1− µ)]
2 (1 + 2b) (4− b) , (A.19)
wIIm =
2 (1− b) [a− c (1− µ)] +w (2 + b)
4− b , (A.20)
πIIm =
[a− w − c (1− µ)]2 (2 + b)2 (1 + b)
4 (4− b)2 (1 + 2b)2
. (A.21)
Appendix B
Proofs of Propositions 5 and 7 follow.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Using the equilibrium expressions reported in
Appendix A, and the definition of global welfare given in (11), we can derive
WII −WNN =
[a−w − c (1− µ)]2 b
¡
24 + 41b− 9b2 − 8b3
¢
2 (4− b)2 (2 + b)2 (1 + 2b)
> 0 (B.1)
and
WII −WN =
b2Ω (a− c− w)2 + µc (2 + b) (2 (a− c− w)Φ+ µcΨ)
4 (2 + 3b− b2)2 (6b+ b2 + 4)2 (4− b)2 (1 + 2b)2
, (B.2)
where
Φ=896 + 6912b+ 20 872b2 + 29 644b3 + 15 954b4
−5583b5 − 8408b6 − 222b7 + 1409b8 − 110b9 − 26b10,
Ψ=896 + 6272b+ 16 104b2 + 16 356b3 − 52b4
−10 954b5 − 4642b6 + 1407b7 + 751b8 − 98b9 − 18b10,
Ω=1760 + 10 736b+ 22 876b2 + 16 356b3 − 6147b4
−10 673b5 + 26b6 + 1880b7 − 190b8 − 30b9.
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It is easily verified that Φ, Ψ and Ω are all non-negative for b ∈ (0, 1), which
implies that WII −WN > 0.
(ii) It remains to verify that WII > max {WI ,W0} for b > 0.56. We have
that
WII −WI =
bΛ (a− c− w)2 + µc (2z (a− c− w) + µcΥ)
4 (2 + 3b− b2)2 (16− 12b+ b2)2 (4− b)2 (1 + 2b)2
, (B.3)
where
Λ=−6144 + 2304b+ 35 328b2 − 23 888b3 − 47 312b4 + 55 140b5
−7192b6 − 13 101b7 + 6763b8 − 1238b9 + 78b10,
Υ=28 672 + 73 728b− 79 616b2 − 224 640b3 + 127 808b4 + 174 032b5
−147 412b6 + 24 380b7 + 6459b8 − 2297b9 + 186b10 − 2b11,
z=28 672 + 100 352b+ 20 480b2 − 192 640b3 − 42 896b4 + 160 496b5
−21 772b6 − 42 298b7 + 19 153b8 − 2581b9 + 2b10 + 14b11.
The denominator in (B.3) is obviously positive for b ∈ (0, 1), so the sign of
(WII −WI) is determined by the sign of the numerator. Within the relevant
range of b it is easily verified that Λ > 0 if b > 0.56, Υ > 0 if b < 0.78, and
z > 0 for b ∈ (0, 1). The sign of the second term in the numerator of (B.3) can
be determined by noting that both z and Υ reach their minimal value on
[0, 1] at b = 1. It follows that if (2z (a− c− w) + µcΥ) > 0 for b = 1, then
(2z (a− c− w) + µcΥ) > 0 for b ∈ (0, 1). Setting b = 1, 2z (a− c−w) +
2µcΥ reduces to 18 (2998 (a− c−w)− 1039cµ), which is positive for c <
1
2 (a−w). It follows that WII −WI > 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] if Λ > 0, which is true
for b > 0.56.
Finally, we have that
WII −W0 =
(2 + b)
h
(2b− 1)Γ (a− c− w)2 + 4µcΘ (2 (a− c−w) + µc)
i
8 (4− b)2 (2b+ 1)2 (3b+ 2)2
,
(B.4)
where
Γ = b
¡
48 + 126b+ 25b2 − 73b3 + 6b4
¢
> 0,
Θ =
¡
14 + 21b− 11b2
¢
(3b+ 2)2 > 0.
We see that WII −W0 > 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] if b > 12 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider first the sequential acquisition game. We
solve the game by backward induction. At stage 2 there are three possibilities:
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1. No bid at stage 1. Firm 2 is the designated bidder. If it does not bid,
there will be no acquisitions, and profits are π0 for all firms. If firm
2 chooses to bid on another firm, the other domestic firm (firm 1) or
one of the foreign firms (3 or 4) will be the target. First, let us assume
that firm 2 bids on firm 1. If firm 2 acquires firm 1, total profits for
the two firms would be 2πNm. However, the two foreign firms can also
bid. If one of them wins, total profits for those two firms will be 2πIm.
Since 2πIm > 2π
0, firm 1 will accept a bid of π0 + ε from either of
the foreign firms (3 or 4). But such a bid is not an equilibrium, since
the other foreign firm will have an incentive to bid higher. In fact, a
bidding competition between the two foreign firms would result in a bid
of B = 2πIm − πIo, which is the reservation bid for each of the foreign
firms. The initial bidder will not find it profitable to match such a bid.
It knows that if it does not win, it earns πIo, while if it wins it earns
2πNm − B. Its reservation bid would then be B = 2πNm − πIo. Since
2πIm > 2π
N
m, we will observe an international rather than a national
acquisition. Second, let us assume that firm 2 decides to bid on firm 3,
which is a firm in the foreign country. From the above discussion we see
that it can succeed with such an acquisition if it bids B = 2πIm − πIo,
making a profit of πIo. Since π
I
o > π
0, this implies that making a bid
would make firm 2 is strictly better oﬀ, and there will be an international
acquisition in equilibrium.
2. A national acquisition at stage 1. Firm 1 acquires firm 2 at stage 1, and
there is no longer possible with an international acquisition. At stage
2, there will either be no acquisition, or a national acquisition. If firm 3
decides not to bid, there will be no acquisition, and its profit is equal to
πNo . On the other hand, if firm 3 wants to acquire firm 4, it has to bid B
≥ πNo , which are the profits of the target firm in case of no acquisition.
The acquiring firm will then earn 2πNNm − πNo . Since 2πNNm − πNo > πNo
only for some parameter values, the outcome is generally ambiguous.
3. An international acquisition at stage 1. If firm 2 decides not to bid, then
there will be no acquisition. In such a case its profit is equal to πIo. On
the other hand, if firm 2 wants to acquire the available (foreign) target,
it has to bid B ≥ πIo, making a profit of 2πIIm −πIo. Since 2πIIm −πIo > πIo
for all parameter values, there will be an international acquisition in
equilibrium.
Turning now to stage 1 of the game, there are two possibilities to consider:
1. No bid at stage 1. We know from the above analysis that if no acquisition
occurs at stage 1, there will be an international acquisition at stage 2. It
implies that firm 2 acquires either firm 3 or 4, and firm 1 is the outsider,
making a profit of πIo.
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2. A bid at stage 1. The bidding firm can either bid on a national or an
international firm at stage 1. We will discuss each of those alternatives.
To simplify the presentation, let us assume that if a national acquisition
occurs at stage 1, there will be a second national acquisition at stage 2.
It can easily be shown that our conclusion will not change if we assumed
that there would be no second national acquisition. If firm 1 bids on
firm 2, then firm 4 will be the one of the two remaining firms with the
lowest profits if firm 1 succeeds, earning πNo . Its reservation bid for firm
2 at the first stage of the game will then be B = 2πIIm −πNo . Firm 1 can
only succeed if it matches such a bid. If so, it earns 2πNNm − (2πIIm−πNo ).
Similarly, if firm 1 bids on firm 3, firm 4 will be the one of the remaining
two firms with the lowest profits if firm 1 succeeds. If it succeeds, firm 4
earns πIo. Its reservation bid will then be B = 2π
II
m−πIo. Firm 1 can only
succeed if it matches such a bid. If so, it earns 2πIIm − (2πIIm −πIo) = πIo.
By comparison we see that firm 1 will be better oﬀ with a bid on firm
3 rather than firm 2 if πIo > 2π
NN
m − (2πIIm − πNo ). It can easily be
verified that this is always true, which implies that we will observe an
international acquisition, if any, at stage 1 of the game.
Finally, we have to check whether there will be any acquisition at all at
stage 1. We see that firm 1’s profit is πIo, both in the case of no bid and in the
case of a bid on firm 3. Given that each firm by assumption would bid if it is
indiﬀerent, firm 1 will bid at stage 1 and make an international acquisition.
Now, consider the simultaneous acquisition game. Our procedure is to
show that a unilateral deviation is profitable in all cases, except for the market
structure with two international acquisitions.
1. No acquisitions. Firm 1 will obviously find it profitable to bid π0 on the
target firm 4 and earn 2πIm − π0 > 0.
2. One national acquisition. Assume that firm 1 bids on firm 2. It must
oﬀer firm 2 at least π0, and firm 1 can at most earn 2πNm−π0. But then
firm 3 will deviate. It can bid π0 + ε, and earn 2πIm − π0 − ε, which is
strictly better than πNo .
3. One international acquisition. As explained in the discussion of stage 2
of the sequential game, the second initial bidder will find it profitable
to deviate by acquiring the second target.
4. Two national acquisitions. Each of the bidders can earn at most 2πNNm −
πNo by bidding π
N
o , the outside option for the target firm. However, a
bidder can deviate by bidding πNo + ε for the other target firm, earning
2πIm − πNo − ε. Since 2πIm > 2πNNm , this deviation is profitable if ε is
suﬃciently close to zero
5. Two international acquisitions. Each of the bidders can earn at most
2πIIm − πIo by bidding πIo. A bidder can deviate by bidding πIo + ε for
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the other target firm, earning 2πNm − πIo − ε. Since 2πIIm > 2πNm, such a
deviation is not profitable. Furthermore, since 2πIIm − πIo > πIo, it is not
profitable to withdraw its own bid and be an outsider firm in a market
with one international acquisition. Q.E.D.
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FIGURE 1. Profit eﬀects of a national merger when a = 1 and w = c = 14 .
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FIGURE 2. Socially optimal market structures for a = 1 and w = c = 14 .
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FIGURE 3. Domestically most preferred market structure when µ = 0.
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FIGURE 4. Domestically most preferred market structure when µ = 0.05,
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